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Abstract: 
 
● Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of disaster 
rehabilitation interventions on bonding social capital in the aftermath of 
Typhoon Yolanda.   
● Design/methodology/approach: The data from the project is drawn from eight 
barangays in Tacloban City, the Philippines. Local residents and politicians 
were surveyed and interviewed to examine perceptions of resilience and 
community self-help.  
● Findings: The evidence shows that haphazard or inequitable distribution of 
relief goods and services generated discontent within communities. However, 
whilst perceptions of community cooperation and self-help are relatively low, 
perceptions of resilience are relatively high.    
● Research limitations/implications: This research was conducted in urban 
communities after a sudden large-scale disaster. The findings are not 
necessarily applicable in the rural context or in relation to slow onset disasters.    
● Practical implications: Relief agencies should think more carefully about the 
social impact of the distribution of relief goods and services. Inequality can 
undermine community level cooperation.   
● Social implications: A better consideration of social as well as material capital 
in the aftermath of disaster could help community self-help, resilience and 
positive adaptation.   
● Originality/value: This study draws on evidence from local communities to 
contradict the overarching rhetoric of resilience in the aftermath of Typhoon 
Yolanda.   
 
Introduction: 
 
On 8 November 2013 super-typhoon Yolanda (international name: Haiyan) hit the 
Visayas region of the Philippines. Typhoon Yolanda (herein referred to as Yolanda) 
was one of the strongest typhoons ever to make landfall with wind speeds of up to 
315 kms per hour and a storm surge that reached six meters in some coastal areas 
(Lagmay, 2014). Official figures show that 6,293 individuals were reported dead, 
1,061 went missing and 28,689 were injured. In total, approximately 16 million 
people were affected by Yolanda. Tacloban, a highly urbanised city[1]. and 
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administrative centre of the Eastern Visayas region, suffered the greatest damage in 
terms of casualties and infrastructure (NDRRMC, 2014). Yolanda was an extreme, 
but by no means isolated, event as typhoons in the region are becoming more frequent 
and intense (Mei and Xie, 2016). Coupled with increasing urbanization, typhoons 
have an increased likelihood of turning into disasters with the poor being the least 
able to mitigate, adapt or migrate.  
 
After Yolanda, the media, government officials, aid agencies and survivors 
themselves, frequently referenced resilience and bayanihan in relation to post-disaster 
recovery (Gawad Kalinga, 2013; Viray, 2014; Castaneda, 2015). Resilience is about 
endurance and adaptation,[2] whilst bayanihan is the Filipino principle of mutual 
effort. Bayanihan is akin to “bonding” social capital and is arguably especially 
important amongst poor communities that are lacking other forms of capital. Broadly, 
social capital refers to the norms and networks that contribute to collective action 
(Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). However, social capital is not necessarily about 
people acting in the “best” way, it is also about acting in predictable ways[3]. 
Rehabilitation schemes that do not account for local realities will be unsustainable. 
This article focuses on the factors that limited trust within communities as well as 
trust between survivors and those tasked with relief and rehabilitation after Yolanda. 
We argue that inequity was a key driver of mistrust during post-disaster recovery. The 
sometimes-chaotic distribution of relief goods and services and seemingly random 
benchmarks established for government compensation, undermined the growth of 
resilient and cohesive communities. The guiding themes in our work are therefore 
trust and equity as they relate to bonding social capital.  
 
We argue that both resilience and bayanihan were in fact “myths” that masked 
negative coping strategies and resentment over the unequal distribution of aid and the 
slow pace of the relief effort. In fact, the relief effort exacerbated existing inequalities 
and created new ones. In addition, it triggered social divisiveness and envy and 
caused deep personal resentment and anguish amongst the excluded (Ong, 2015; 
Wilkinson, 2015, p.22). We will show that the failure to distribute resources 
transparently and efficiently undermined trust and bayanihan. This made it hard to 
form the norms and networks that help social capital grow.  
 
The first section of this article provides a brief overview of the social capital literature 
and its relevance for post-disaster recovery. We also outline the key terms and 
concepts central to our argument. The second section explains why we chose 
Tacloban as a case study and outlines our data gathering methods. Our argument is 
informed by a range of primary survey data, gathered from eight barangays in 
Tacloban in 2014, 2015 and 2016, a number of interviews and focus group 
discussions held with government officials, relief agencies and survivors. The next 
section compares the narratives of resilience and bayanihan that were observed after 
Yolanda against the conditions that survivors actually experienced. The following 
discussion section examines the damaging effects of claiming resilience and 
bayanihan when in fact the process of recovery was not as positive or socially 
cohesive as these terms suggest. In conclusion, we examine why this matters more 
broadly for post-disaster recovery amongst the urban poor.    
 
Social Capital  
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Social capital is argued to be the capital of the poor because it is commonly asserted 
that while poor people lack material assets, they can generally rely on kinship and 
social networks to protect themselves against “routine deprivation” and occasional 
risks and shocks. Perhaps unsurprisingly social capital has also been presented as a 
core driver of post-disaster recovery (Aldrich, 2012; Aldrich and Meyer, 2015, 
Reininger et al., 2013). This is based on the assumption that strong bonding ties help 
poor households to more easily recover, especially when other forms of material 
capital are in short supply. However, the link between social capital and post-disaster 
recovery is still unclear and until more studies are done, a strictly optimistic view 
overlooks the significant structural barriers poor households face regularly and during 
post-disaster recovery.  
 
Putnam conceptualized social capital as “features of social organization, such as trust, 
norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating 
coordinated actions” (1993, p.167). Trust, norms and networks were subsequently 
used to identify indicators for social capital (Schuller et al., 2000). Meanwhile, Lin 
presents social capital as a simple “investment in social relations with expected 
returns in the marketplace” with the marketplace being understood as economic, 
political, labour based or exchanges within communities (2001, p.19). Consequently, 
investment in social capital is a profit seeking endeavour.    
Following the logic of investment and return, social capital has become a popular 
concept in development policy because it specifies a resource – a type of capital – to 
be tapped and strategically mobilized by individuals and groups to meet their needs 
(Cleaver, 2005; Fafchamps, 2007). Specifically, three types of social capital are 
identified: bonding, bridging and linking. Woolcock and Narayan (2000) define 
bonding social capital as ties among people who tend to be closely connected, such as 
immediate family members, neighbours, and close friends. Bridging social capital 
refers to ties among people from different geographical, occupational and ethnic 
backgrounds who have similar political and economic status. Lastly, linking social 
capital are the ties between the community and people in positions of influence in 
formal organizations, such as schools, agricultural extension offices, the police or 
local or national government entities (Rossing et al., 2010, p.270).  
Social Capital in the Philippines 
The Philippines social science literature has rarely been examined using the 
conceptual framework of bonding, bridging and linking social capital (Abad, 2005). 
Nevertheless, recent studies based on national survey research have provided some 
valuable insights into the state of social capital in the archipelago (Abad, 2005; Porio, 
2017). Both studies found that rich bonding capital among family and friends is 
pervasive in Philippines society but most Filipinos lack bridging and linking capital. 
These findings confirm decades old findings about the strength of kin and friendship 
ties in Filipino society (Pal, 1966; Carroll, 1968; Morais, 1981). Exchanges of 
assistance within a network are often seen as acts of duty, love and care. “Thick trust” 
operates within these networks. Thick trust is defined by Putnam as “trust embedded 
in personal relations that are strong, frequent, and embedded in wider networks” 
(2000, p.136). In contrast “thin trust” or generalized trust is a person’s estimation of 
the general moral standards of the surrounding society. In Filipino society, there is a 
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scarcity of social cohesion and a lack of thin trust (Abad, 2005; Rothstein and 
Uslaner, 2005). Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) note that while some measurements of 
trust are low in the Philippines, there are many different types of trust. Thick trust is 
extremely strong so much so that when members of one’s family makes a request of 
them, it is almost impossible to refuse. However, such forms of allegiance can also 
lead to negative forms of social capital such as the “in-group” acceptance of 
corruption and nepotism (Lin, 2001) or criminal behaviour.   
Abad (2005) found that cooperation, as a communal coping mechanism akin to 
bonding social capital, is based on cultural norms such as bayanihan as opposed to 
associational regulations. Bayanihan has been described by Bankoff as “toiling on 
another’s behalf and assuming another’s burdens” (2003, p.168) whilst Cox and Cox 
refer to bayanihan as “a cultural immune system that heals over wounds [...] allowing 
life to carry on” (2016, p.48). Bayanihan was first referenced in relation to the 
communal effort in agricultural communities however “the tradition has diffused 
throughout Filipino society and is an expression of team spirit and sharing of labour” 
(Beza et al, 2018, p.142). The bonding inherent in these norms is akin to social capital 
and fosters thick trust within communities. People trust that if they follow the norms 
of bayanihan then they will get a return on their investment as people will help them 
too.       
Sztompka (1999, p.25) defines trust as a “bet about the future contingent actions of 
others.” Similarly, Ostrom and Ahn see it as “a particular level of subjective 
probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will 
perform a particular action” (2003, p.xvi). Both of these definitions see trust as a 
belief and a commitment, which is what separates trust from “hope” or “confidence”. 
Sztompka (1999, p.24) argues that trust is not a “discourse of faith” but a “discourse 
of agency” demanding the agents to actively anticipate and face an unknown future 
and make a bet to act favourably towards one another. A major contributing factor to 
the low levels of thin trust in Philippines society is inequality. Despite sustained 
economic growth there is significant deprivation in the Philippines with 26.3 percent 
of the population living in poverty in the first semester of 2015 (PSA, 2016c). 
Meanwhile in 2016, the wealth of the 50 richest Filipinos equated to 24.24% of the 
countries’ entire GDP (Dela Paz and Schnabel, 2017). Rothstein and Uslaner argue 
that as a result of severe inequalities, the “sense of a shared fate” is eroded between 
the rich and the poor or in the worst case, it has completely disintegrated (2005, p.46). 
This contrast is especially evident in densely packed urban environments.  
Social Capital and Resilience 
Post-disaster resilience, especially in impoverished environments, entails interaction 
with and the governance of communities. Consequently, notions of resilience as a 
personal or individual trait are limited; instead resilience is better understood as “the 
interaction between person and environment, in which individuals under adverse 
conditions utilize internal and external resources to achieve positive adaptation” (Pan 
and Chan, 2007, p.165). Resilience is about personal and community capacities and 
the ability of both to self-organise and adapt. Resilience against and in the aftermath 
of disasters is ecological and social (Adger et al, 2005; Cote and Nightingale, 2012) 
and ‘people’s responses to natural hazards are part of their notions of how to 
successfully engage with both their physical and socio-cultural worlds (Dalisay and 
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De Guzman, 2016, p.704). Studies have suggested that where strong social ties exist 
resilience is greater (Aldrich, 2012; Aldrich and Meyer, 2015; Bankoff, 2007). 
Resiliency has to be looked at through a community lens as “social norms, social 
capital and social networks in which individuals are embedded will determine disaster 
behaviour and the outcomes of a disaster” (Alcayna et al, 2016). Resilience then is 
about people, their social networks and the communities they live in, the environment 
they inhabit and positive adaptation. The following section outlines our choice of case 
study and data gathering strategies.   
Data Gathering 
Geographically, Tacloban is low lying, faces east towards the Pacific and experiences 
regular typhoons. Tacloban, as the largest and most devastated city in the region, 
became the focus of the relief effort in the aftermath of Yolanda and was therefore 
chosen as the case study for this article. Narratives of resilience and bayanihan 
referenced Tacloban more than any other area struck by Yolanda. The fact that 
Tacloban was the hometown of former first lady, Imelda Marcos, and that the Mayor 
of Tacloban was her nephew, simply fueled that exposure.  
 
Poverty incidence in Tacloban was reported as 9.8 percent in 2012 (PSA, 2016a, pp. 
2-17), much lower than the regional average of 31.4 percent (PSA, 2016b). However, 
there are pockets of deep poverty in the city especially in vulnerable coastal areas and 
the perception of relative affluence in the city encourages inward migration. These 
issues make Tacloban emblematic of wider trends of urbanisation and poverty that are 
evident in other demographically similar Asian cities that are vulnerable to 
comparable environmental hazards. Consequently, we can draw lessons from the 
social and material rehabilitation of Tacloban in order to inform future disaster 
rehabilitation practice in poor urban communities. However we are mindful that 
social capital and bayanihan as indicators of resilience are complex, dynamic, in 
some instances fleeting. Nevertheless, our critical analysis of the narratives of 
resilience, social capital and bayanihan can help to inform more accurate and 
responsible characterizations of social cohesion after mega-disasters.           
 
The Philippine Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act 7160) legislated for a 
degree of decentralisation under which a system of Local Government Units (LGUs), 
e.g. provinces, cities and municipalities could enjoy a degree of administrative 
autonomy whilst still being accountable to the national government. Tacloban is one 
such LGU. LGUs are further sub-divided into barangays that are the smallest 
administrative unit in the Philippines run by elected officials. This article is based on 
evidence drawn from eight barangays in Tacloban of comparable size. The barangays 
chosen were predominantly ‘most affected’ by Yolanda as they are coastal and low 
lying. These barangays were located in three clusters in different areas of the city, 
Anibong (66 and 66-A), Magallanes (54 and 54-A), San Jose (87, 88 and 89) and 
Abucay (91). By investigating eight barangays, that suffered a similar degree of 
damage from the same disaster and were governed by the same City Hall, we will 
identify the factors that hindered or supported bonding social capital over time in 
similar but different localities.       
 
We conducted 320 surveys (40 per barangay) in 2015, 2016 and 2017. The surveys 
included questions on self-help within the communities and self-perceptions of 
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resilience. By conducting surveys over time we were able to identify general trends in 
relation to how survivors viewed bayanihan within their communities. We also 
conducted a number of focus groups that targeted specific categories of resident such 
as women, the elderly and out of school youth and we interviewed two families in 
each barangay (16 in total) in 2015 and 2016 to get an in-depth understanding on how 
the recovery of these families was progressing.  
 
We interviewed every barangay captain in 2015, 2016 and 2017, and in some cases 
also members of the barangay councils. Interviews were semi-structured and followed 
a series of questions that related to disaster relief and rehabilitation in the immediate 
and medium term. We were reflexive in our questions. When it became clear that 
certain issues, such as the haphazard distribution of some resources, were being 
mentioned on a repeat basis we adapted our strategy to incorporate repeat testing of 
these issues. We also cross-referenced our primary data with policy statements and 
independent observations as they relate to the relief effort.  
 
Nevertheless, our results should be treated with caution as it was common for 
interviewees to contradict themselves. Saying for instance that they received 
sufficient aid in response to one question and later in the interview saying that they 
still needed more help. This could be put down to forgetfulness, survey fatigue or 
calculations or expectations of “reward or punishment for any reply” (De Ville de 
Goyet, 2008, p.42). We also found that survivors were prone to accepting relief goods 
even when they had no need for them, a primary example being fishing boats given to 
non-fishers. One can assume that aid agencies suffered from the same inconsistencies 
in self-assessments of need.     
 
Resilience and Social Capital: Rhetoric and Reality  
 
Before Yolanda struck the Philippines then President Benigno Aquino III called on 
Filipinos to “cooperate with the authorities and exercise ‘bayanihan’” (Tan, 2013) in 
light of the incoming typhoon. Subsequent to the disaster, numerous news agencies 
made reference to the bayanihan spirit in relation to local rehabilitation efforts (Viray, 
2014; Castaneda, 2015) and donations and fundraising organised by the Filipino 
diaspora and the international community in general (GMA News Online, 2013; 
Abenoja and Lacamiento, 2014). International statesmen including then President 
Barack Obama (Obama, 2013) and Chief of the United Nations Commission for 
Refugees, Bernard Kerblat (Quismundo, 2013) also made reference to bayanihan as a 
national trait. Bayanihan then was being articulated not just as a form of bonding 
social capital evident between similar people in the same locality, it was also being 
articulated as a form of linking social capital capable of bringing diverse people 
together as part of the relief and rehabilitation effort.  
 
There was an overarching view that bayanihan, as a system of trust, norms and 
networks would be in evidence as bonding social capital within communities. 
Bayanihan was also used to explain bridging networks between strangers that 
contributed financially or physically to the relief effort. This applied in terms of the 
simple donation of money or goods but in some cases it also resulted in volunteerism 
where people not related to the devastated communities offered their labour gratis e.g. 
the US based group All Hands Volunteers (All Hands Volunteers, 2018). On many 
occasions, we witnessed volunteers from this group digging drains and repairing 
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houses and barangay halls. To an extent, this foreign volunteerism also inspired the 
locals to become involved in the cooperative effort. 
 
Another group, the Buddhist organisation Tzu Chi, took a slightly different approach 
to fostering aspects of bayanihan as they adopted “Cash for Work” programs where 
survivors were paid an allowance for clearing up their own neighbourhoods and later 
rebuilding houses. In an article on their website, the CEO of Tzu Chi Philippines, 
noted that the allowance they receive is “not a salary or a payment for their 
work…[t]his assistance is our money to help you recover from the tragedy” (Bolisay, 
2013). As such, some locals viewed “Cash for Work” as a form of bayanihan when in 
reality the involvement of payment does not align with the traditional understanding 
of bayanihan as voluntary work. 
 
Tzu Chi also gave unconditional cash transfers of between USD $270 to USD $400 
based on family size (Ong et al., 2015, p.26). The large amounts and unconditional 
nature of the assistance was unlike the assistance offered by other humanitarian 
organizations which often came with conditions on expenditure. Many of our 
interviewees preferred this type of cash transfer over others as they felt it was fair. 
This type of assistance differed from “bonding” type arrangements that operates 
between families or friends because the cultural expectation would be that the money 
would be paid back or the favour be returned in the future. As a result, many of our 
interviewees and survey respondents cited Tzu Chi as the organisation that helped 
them the most. The forms of cooperation supported by organizations like All Hands 
and Tzu Chi pushed the geographical boundaries of bayanihan as goods and labour 
were given to strangers with no expectation of a return.  
 
However, the survey data that we gathered in our selected barangays told a less 
optimistic story about community cooperation. 70 percent of survey respondents in 
2015 reported that people in their community[4] helped each other ‘if their household 
income was not enough’ before Yolanda (with a yes or no option only). However 
post-Yolanda the numbers of respondents that reported meaningful help dropped 
significantly. The table below outlines the responses gathered over three years after 
Yolanda. 
 
Table 1: To What Extent Did Your Community Help Itself After Yolanda? 
 
  A lot Not much Some Did Not Help 
Itself 
2015 10.9 69.4 18.8 0.5 
2016 3.1 48.8 25 23.1 
8	  
2017 11.4 23.2 23.9 23.5 
  
 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to compare these figures to the question “would you 
describe yourself as resilient post-typhoon Yolanda”? Those giving a positive 
response to the question numbered 62.5 percent in 2015, 69.2 in 2016 and 68.6 in 
2017. These figures seem to indicate that the majority of survivors did consider 
themselves to be resilient however this feeling of resilience was not matched with 
confidence in self-help in communities that could be equated to bonding social capital 
or bayanihan. Nevertheless, survivors remain largely optimistic.  
 
Community clean ups were cited in June 2017 focus groups as a way that 
communities came together to help each other. However, inefficient barangay 
captains and weak leadership were mentioned as an impediment to community 
cohesion. In general, focus group respondents and interviewees cited disaster 
preparedness as a form of resilience with poverty and a lack of livelihood being  
 
 equated to a lack of resilience. In 2015 (two years after Yolanda), all eight barangay 
captains cited the Tzu Chi Foundation as one of the groups that helped them the most 
in the aftermath of the disaster and on an ongoing basis. Virtually all our family 
interviewees also mentioned Tzu Chi as a primary or significant source of help and 
the organisation was credited with bringing about ‘community cohesion’.  
 
Tzu Chi was credited with setting an example to people in that they encouraged 
people to come together to clean up their own communities. However, this was not a 
perfect system as sometimes respondents claimed the “Cash for Work” was offered 
without them having to do the work. One barangay captain stated that those who did 
this were “the kind of people that if they get the money they have won” (Villanueva, 
2015), in other words they were more interested in cash gain than community benefit. 
This is further evidence that while “Cash for Work” may look and feel like bayanihan 
to some of our interviewees, the incentives and driving factors behind the collective 
action do not resemble the traditional conceptualization of the principle.  
 
The barangay captains told us that, in the immediate aftermath of the typhoon when 
their communities were effectively cut off from the outside world, they became self-
policing. We were told that the barangay police, or tanods, were mobilised to keep the 
area safe and rotas were set up to keep fires burning at intersections during the night. 
We were told that “we were all helping each other at that time, there were no poor and 
no rich, we were all at the same level” (Ruterto, 2015). People also mobilised to 
collect their own dead for burial as the authorities were initially overwhelmed with 
the task before them (Bahin, 2015). From our family interview data, we were also 
able to establish that it was very common for people to share food and clothes in the 
immediate aftermath of the disaster. The clothes issue was an important one as people 
were sometimes left with only the clothes they were wearing, or even none at all, after 
the typhoon.     
 
But responses from focus group discussions revealed that these acts of bayanihan and 
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collective action tended to be temporary. When asked “How would you describe 
community/barangay participation and cohesion after Yolanda?”, different focus 
groups reported different answers. Six of the total 11 groups reported initial 
cooperation immediately after the typhoon. For instance, an elderly participant noted 
that: “Cooperation in the community was at its best immediately after Super Typhoon 
Yolanda. We were more sympathetic with each other. But it was only for about a 
month. Once we were back to our feet, we turned to being more individualistic”. This 
sentiment was echoed by another participant, who said that “Immediately after Super 
Typhoon Yolanda, we helped each other. Now, it is to each his own”. This sentiment 
was echoed by another participant who noted that: “People became friends after 
Yolanda but when relief operations started, there were again squabbles. Attitudes and 
behaviour worsened. It was as if people did not learn from the Yolanda experience”. 
 
Three focus groups cited an increase in community cohesion, noting that there was 
“better participation and cooperation” in the community, residents were “more 
helpful” and interacted more with each other, and in general were “more organised”. 
However, two focus groups had purely negative views of community participation 
and cohesion. One participant said that “People in the barangay are back to being 
individualistic. Generally, they only show up if there is distribution of any assistance. 
Envy cannot be avoided”.  
 
Another issue that presented a problem for bonding social capital was that 
communities were disrupted and residents displaced by both Yolanda and the 
relocation programs that moved people away from the dangerous coastal areas. In 
Tacloban, this involved moving people into temporary housing and then permanent 
housing in “Tacloban North”. For reasons beyond the scope of this article, relocation 
has been a protracted and problematic process (Iuchi and Maly, 2017; Ong, 2016). 
Whilst many interviewees stated that they were still in touch with their old neighbours 
“day to day”, bayanihan cannot work over relatively long distances[5]. The captain of 
barangay 88 even reported that “established neighbours do not harm each other but 
because they were not neighbours before there has been a lot of trouble in the north” 
(Montalban, 2017) citing cases of arguing and even rape. Nevertheless, everyone that 
we interviewed supported the National Housing Authority raffle system (Roca, 2017) 
that allocates housing lots in the permanent relocation areas on a random basis. When 
we asked respondents whether they would not rather be near their old friends and 
neighbours, they responded that they did not trust the authorities to allocate the 
houses fairly.       
 
Discussion      
 
Our evidence indicates that the distribution of aid generated discontent in the 
communities. Even though aid agencies were meant to liaise with City Hall and the 
barangay captains to ascertain who was eligible for aid this did not always work well 
as checks were not made, records were lost or the barangays captains allegedly 
favoured friends and relatives over others. When asked if aid was distributed fairly 
key concerns of family interviewees were that the master lists of those eligible for aid 
drawn up by barangay captains were tampered with and that goods were not 
distributed fairly. In some cases, this led to simmering resentment within communities 
and whilst this can be dismissed as petty jealousy, the perception of unfairness or 
exclusion can also have a “profound effect on people’s self-confidence and civic and 
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political connectedness” (Ong et al., 2015, p.42). As such, the inequitable approach 
used by NGOs and government officials for the allocation of relief goods and services 
undermined the growth of resilient and cohesive communities.  
 
Our findings suggests people only “invest” in social capital/relationships because they 
have the expectation of some sort of return (Brisson, 2005, p.644). If that return is 
uncertain, the investment will not be made. Returns may be uncertain after the shock 
of a disaster and the inability of governments or relief agencies to set up credible 
flows of information or manage the distribution and use of resources inhibits bonding 
social capital. We discovered that the manner in which goods were distributed by 
some governmental and non-governmental relief agencies was dictated by programme 
time limits and the need to be “seen” by donors, the public and those in charge, to be 
doing something meaningful. This meant that, in some cases, the distribution of 
“visible” materials goods was prioritised over less visible tasks such as the 
comprehensive monitoring of the equitable allocation of goods and services. For this 
reason, our family respondents reported unease when barangay halls were rebuilt in 
new locations away from their homes as they were less able to monitor visitors and 
the potential distribution of goods on a first come first served basis.      
 
Moreover, the visibility of aid itself, especially when selection and distribution were 
deemed to be inequitable by many in the community, was a source of invisible pain 
such as anxiety and resentment among excluded survivors. Our findings confirm the 
observations made by Ong et al. (2015) that vehicles, banner and posters with NGO 
logos were a common sight among affected communities and their presence often led 
to feelings of resentment among excluded survivors who felt the NGOs presence was 
a constant reminder of their exclusion. Issues of inclusion and exclusion were 
magnified within highly urbanized environments because the outcomes of unequitable 
aid are highly visible due to their close geographical proximity. Houses that were 
completely rebuilt were situated next door to houses that did not receive such relief 
and are either covered in tarpaulin or other scrapped goods.  
 
Our results show that the reality on the ground was not as positive or socially 
cohesive as the persistent media, humanitarian and political rhetoric referencing 
resilience and the significance of bayanihan suggested. While a majority of barangay 
captains reported examples of bayanihan immediately after the disaster such as self-
policing and sharing food and clothes, observations gave the overwhelming 
impression that the cooperative spirit was short-lived. We found that once the initial 
disaster and aftermath passed, people reverted to more individualistic behaviour. 
These findings are not surprising given that highly urbanized areas fuel individualism. 
This was also reflected in our results when a majority of respondents reported their 
community has “not helped itself much” in the years after Yolanda. As such, our 
findings show that both resilience and bayanihan were myths constructed in the 
aftermath of the typhoon to cover up and distract from the resentment of locals over 
the unequal distribution of aid and the social divisions they caused. 
 
This contradiction was also evident in the way that survivors reported a lack of 
cohesion and self-help in communities whilst at the same time reporting individual 
resilience. This may have been because people did not want to self-report individual 
“weakness” or because they were socialised into a mindset of strength and endurance. 
It is also possible that negative coping strategies such as reduction in food intake, 
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tolerance of poor living conditions and increased debt were equated with resilience. 
But this contradiction also implies a lack of trust in reciprocated benefits from 
cooperative action. If social capital is seen as a market-based type of exchange then 
this market was disrupted by the inequitable distribution of relief goods and services.    
 
Conclusion 
 
The evidence above illustrates that notions of bayanihan after Yolanda were 
overstated. Bayanihan was a term that originated in farming communities. It worked 
within the rhythm of harvests and the weather and was based upon common 
expectations, benefits and trust. The urban poor will still invest in bayanihan, or 
bonding social capital, if returns are certain and “thick” trust prevails. However, the 
lack of transparency and perceived inequity that characterised the distribution of relief 
goods and services and the fragmentation of communities meant that returns became 
haphazard and uncertain. Consequently, social capital floundered as people resorted 
to cost benefit calculations of coordinated action.  
 
Whilst the inequitable distribution of relief goods can cause hardship and distress in 
the first instance it can also undermine social cohesion. During disasters, existing 
social networks may be disrupted because of death and displacement and the norms, 
networks and trust that social capital relies on must be successfully reconfigured in 
order for bonding social capital to grow. This should be a priority for those tasked 
with disaster rehabilitation efforts, especially in poor communities.   
 
We find that the pervasive rhetoric of resilience and bayanihan were “myths” that 
acted as a disclaimer and reduced these terms to a state of mind or even a national 
trait, regardless of the reality on the ground. As bayanihan, as a form of social 
resilience, is essentially distorted in the low-trust urban context and the fact that it was 
not that evident after the initial emergency phase is perhaps not that surprising. 
Doubtless there were many cases of survivors overcoming significant odds to regain 
their social and material well-being, however, resilience was also casually equated 
with negative coping strategies. Relief agencies need to dig deeper into what 
community resilience actually means and how they can foster positive outcomes in 
this regard.    
 
For Tacloban, the inequitable distribution of aid changed urban poor communities for 
the worse, causing social divisions, conflict and further individualism. Consequently, 
the post-disaster context is a moving target. Resilience is not just about recreating the 
society that was destroyed or staying the same, it is about successful adaptation to a 
new post-disaster reality. In Tacloban that new reality was coloured by the experience 
of the inequitable distribution of aid. It was not just the physical impact of Yolanda 
that altered communities it was also the social impact of inequitable humanitarian 
action.   
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[2]. In Tagalog resilience translates to matibay, which means strong and stable, as opposed to adaptive.  
[3]. For instance, certain levels of corruption may be expected and tolerated, with problems only 
emerging when corrupt activities become excessive.   
[4]. However, the distinction between family and community should be treated with caution as large 
extended families were the norm amongst barangay residents. This meant that the distinction between 
neighbor and relative was fluid. 
[5]. The new settlements in the North are around 15 kms away from the coast. 	  
